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Dimensions of Genocide: The Circumplex Model Meets
Violentization Theory
Mark A. Winton
University of Central Florida, Orlando, Florida
The purpose of this study is to examine the use of Olson’s (1995, 2000)
family therapy based circumplex model and Athens’ (1992, 1997, 2003)
violentization theory in explaining genocide. The Rwandan genocide of
1994 is used as a case study. Published texts, including interviews with
perpetrators, research reports, human rights reports, and court
transcripts were analyzed. The use of both theories was consistent with the
data and resulted in a greater understanding of the genocide. Rwanda
moved to a rigidly enmeshed society during the genocide with the
perpetrators going through the violentization process. Suggestions for
further research are provided. Key Words: Genocide, Circumplex Model,
Violentization Theory, and Rwanda

Introduction
Genocides have continued to occur despite international intervention. The primary
purpose of my work is to present two approaches that may be used to understand
genocide. I decided to use the Rwandan genocide as a case study for several reasons:
first, the Rwandan genocide is documented in professional journals, books, monographs,
and court transcripts; second, the genocide occurred recently; third, intervention by other
countries was absent; and fourth, the genocide occurred over a short period of time.
There is a lack of research on genocide in the criminological field that makes it
difficult to develop theories (Morrison, 2004). Yacoubian (2000) showed that
criminologists have neglected presentations of genocides at professional conferences, in
the professional journals, and in academic criminology departments leading Day and
Vandiver (2000) to recommend incorporation of genocide studies into the criminal justice
field. Yacoubian explained the neglect of genocide in criminological research as a result
of: lack of funding, research method limitations, research focus on local events, and
educational deficits about genocide. Day and Vandiver have pointed out that
criminological theory does apply to genocide.
My interest in developing a research area and course focusing on genocide
occurred in 2001 after I recognized that there were few genocide courses available from
criminal justice departments. I had primarily been teaching graduate students who
worked in law enforcement and corrections, and I developed an elective graduate course
called, Criminal Justice Perspectives on Genocide. The objectives of the course were to
critically examine theories of genocide from multidisciplinary perspectives, to apply
evidence based data to understanding the precursors of genocide, to compare and contrast
several case studies of genocide, to examine critically the organizational features of
genocide, to analyze the roles that criminal justice majors may play in studying and
preventing genocide, and to interpret and critique the ethical and legal issues criminal
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justice workers face. I have taught this course several times, both in the face to face
format and completely online.
One frustrating aspect of teaching this course is the lack of criminal justice-related
theories on genocide. I conducted qualitative content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005)
on accounts of the Rwandan genocide to assess the use of the circumplex theory from
family therapy (Olson, 1995, 2000) and the criminological based violentization theory
(Athens, 2003). Applying these two theories to the 1994 Rwandan genocide allows both
structural and agency dimensions of the genocide to be addressed. In this study, an
attempt is made to focus on the structural characteristics of the society by using the
circumplex model and the agency factors using the violentization theory. If the theory
provides an adequate fit with the data, future research can be conducted by comparing
additional genocides with the theories in order to validate this approach. Following
Porter’s (2006) recommendations for theoretical and contextual research, I will provide a
general theory of genocide that may be refined to address similarities and differences
between genocides, and approaches which may increase our ability to assess genocidal
risk factors. The primary goal is to trace the process of how a society becomes structured
and supportive of genocidal behavior and how individual perpetrators explain how and
why they commit genocide.
There has been a long history of debate over structure versus agency explanations
of genocide, which has led to models with a focus on one or the other. In discussing the
Holocaust, Moses (1998) pointed out that the “definition of intention requires the
balanced consideration of the agency (ideology) of the perpetrators and the structures
(circumstances) in which they operated” (p. 218). In other words, we cannot understand
genocides with one dimension; therefore we need to address both structure and agency. I
view both structure and agency as important factors that are interrelated. Criminological
theory textbooks contain a multitude of perspectives to address structural and agency
dimensions of criminal activity. For example, texts usually contain chapters on biology
and crime, psychology and crime, crime control theories, and social structure theories.
While the biological and psychological are based on agency, or how individuals make
decisions and behave, the structural approaches are used to direct attention to the
economy, education, political system, and other institutions. Perhaps these theories do not
offer an adequate explanation of genocide when used alone: There is a need for an
approach that one may use to addresses both individual behavior and social conditions
(Porter, 2006; Turner, 2005).
Berger (1995) used an agency-structure framework to examine two brothers’
survival during the Holocaust. Berger stated, “This life history study of two brothers’
survival affords opportunities to examine the relationship between human agency and
social structure, one of the central problems of general social theory” (p. 30). In a similar
way, Porter (2006) suggested a two-step theory of genocide in which a group’s genocidal
ideology leads to bureaucracy. Thus, by focusing on structural and agency aspects of the
genocide, a more comprehensive approach could be developed.
The Circumplex Model
The first theoretical approach is derived from the family therapy circumplex
model of family functioning that focuses on cohesion, flexibility, and communication
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(Olson, 1995, 2000; Olson & DeFrain, 1997). The main assumption of the circumplex
model, which has been extensively studied and applied to family therapy, education, and
research over the past 25 years, is that balanced families function better than those who
exhibit characteristics and patterns that appear to unbalance the families (Olson & Gorall,
2003). Families have various levels of communication skills and patterns that affect their
functioning and levels of cohesion and flexibility (Olson & Gorall). Families, who are
balanced on their levels of cohesion and flexibility, and have adequate communication
skills, are more likely to demonstrate healthy patterns of behavior (Olson, 2000). In
addition, the circumplex model of family functioning is a dynamic model allowing one to
trace changes over time.
In order to explain genocide, I used the circumplex model at the structural level
with a focus on organizations and social groups instead of families (Winton, 2005).
Social groups with high (chaotic) or low (rigid) levels of flexibility and high (enmeshed)
or low (disengaged) levels of cohesion are at increased risk for a variety of social
problems (Winton). Social groups that are balanced on their levels of cohesion and
flexibility are more likely to have lower levels of societal problems (Winton). Coser
(1956) stated that, “each way of meeting an outside threat contains a special danger: too
much rigidity may lead to splits and withdrawals; too much flexibility may lead to a
blurring of boundaries and dissolution in the surrounding environment” (pp. 96-97).
Cohesion, or levels of emotional closeness, range from very low or disengaged to
very high or enmeshed (Olson, 1995, 2000; Olson & Defrain, 1997). Enmeshed cohesion
is demonstrated by a high level of emotional closeness within the perpetrator groups. In
this type of cohesion, perpetrators describe their group as “one big family.” Group loyalty
is also required through strong connections and identification among the perpetrators; a
great deal of perpetrator dependency on one another is present. Deviations from the
expected behaviors are often punished.
Disengaged cohesion is characterized by a pattern of perpetrator emotional
distance. In this pattern, perpetrators show high levels of independence and fail to
demonstrate group loyalty. In the disengaged cohesion pattern, failure to follow the
perpetrator group has minimal negative consequences.
Friedkin (2004) recommends that “theories of social cohesion should be grounded
on the explanation of individuals’ group membership attitudes and behaviors, but they
must also account for the distribution of members’ attitudes and behaviors in a group” (p.
42). The circumplex model can be applied at various levels of scale, although the model
was developed for family assessment and therapy, applications to communities or
societies are feasible.
Flexibility, or the ability for a system to respond to change or crisis, ranges from
very low or rigid to very high or chaotic (Olson, 1995, 2000; Olson & Defrain, 1997).
Rigidity is present when perpetrator leaders use an authoritarian style of leadership to
strictly enforce rules, rigid thinking patterns, and high levels of social control of others.
Another indicator of a rigid group/organization is the inability to change when
confronting a crisis.
Conversely, too much change in response to a stressor or crisis leads to a variety
of problems. Chaotic flexibility is characterized by minimal control over others by the
perpetrator leaders, whose leadership and leadership styles may change rapidly. In cases

Mark A. Winton

608

of chaotic flexibility, patterns of social control are low and rules are not enforced.
Thought patterns are diverse and disorganized.
Justification for violence through various communication methods is used. These
may include the use of radio, television, newspapers, and community leaders. In the
Rwandan genocide, radio broadcasts were used to instruct the perpetrators to kill.
Political speeches may also be used to provide justifications for genocidal behavior.
In my study of 13 separate 20th century genocides (Winton, 2005), by using the
circumplex model, I was able to describe how genocidal societies moved toward
unbalanced levels of cohesion and flexibility, falling into the rigid and enmeshed pattern.
The perpetrator group formed highly cohesive interactions with each other and their
societal institutions, as group loyalty became important for the functioning of the group.
Speaking out against the group could lead to prison, torture, and death. With this rigid
leadership pattern, the perpetrator group exerted high levels of social control.
Missing from my 2005 study was an agency dimension of social interaction. In
order to address the agency dimensions of the Rwandan genocide, I apply Lonnie Athens’
(2003) theory of violentization.
Violentization Theory
Athens’ (2003) theory of violentization is based on symbolic interactionism.
Symbolic interactionism takes social interaction, the self, role taking, and the meanings
of symbols as the main foci (Charon, 1989; Cohen, 1981; Longmore, 1998; Mead, 1977).
Symbolic interactionism is based on the idea that people act based on meanings, which
derive from interaction with others, and are interpreted by the individual (Blumer, 1969).
For example, people who act in violent ways learn how to be violent from other people
who provide social norms and context-specific scripts. People define situations and act
based on those definitions (Cohen).
Athens (2003) developed his theory through detailed interviews with individuals
who have engaged in violent behavior. According to Athens (1997), we need an
interpretative approach that focuses on the “recognition that violent criminal action is
situated and that operates on a model of the violent criminal as an actor” (pp. 25-26).
Athens (1997) pointed out that this approach is rarely used in criminological research
because it constitutes a challenge to the criminological research and theory status quo. In
addition, “the interpretative approach assumes that criminals’ actions are a product of the
individuals’ interpretations of these situations, which past experiences always influence
in important ways but never completely determine” (Athens, 1997, p. 116). The emphasis
is on how the actor makes sense of his or her actions. Like the circumplex model,
violentization theory is used by researchers to address developmental processes of
behavior. Athens (2003) presented this developmental approach with the following four
stages of the violentization process.
•

Brutalization- This stage involves the teaching and demonstration of violent
behavior, which includes threatening to use physical force, observing the use of
physical force, and learning how to use physical force. In the case of genocide,
this stage consists of preparing individuals and groups to act violently against a
specific group. Part of the process involves constructing the genocidal script (e.g.,
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•

•

•

economic, threat, or terror). For example, perpetrator leaders define the victim
group as a serious threat.
Defiance- In this stage, the leaders of the genocide enforce and implement their
belief system to justify the use of violence. The perpetrators define a group as a
threat that needs to be eradicated, and the individual learns that violence is an
alternative to these perceived threats.
Violent Dominant Engagements- This stage focuses on threatening others and
using violent behavior. In this stage, the individuals and groups are directed to use
violence against a group or groups based on the perpetrator belief system to
include segregating the victims, putting the victims in prison, torturing the
victims, and committing homicidal acts by small groups.
Virulency- In this stage, the genocide is in operation. The person or group has
defined themselves as violent or dangerous. This includes the individual within
the group successfully presenting him/herself as a violent and powerful person.
According to Hinton (1998), “to generate genocidal behaviors, sociopolitical
changes must be accompanied by a violent ideology” (p. 117). The shooting down
of the Rwandan president’s plane was used as a starting point for a genocide that
had been planned and organized for several years.

Violentization theory is consistent with Milgram’s (1974) learned predispositions
for obedience, bonding, and strain reduction. Obedient participants who identify with
those promoting violence through coaching and reinforcement may begin to identify
themselves as violent and dangerous individuals (Milgram; Zimbardo, 2007). The power
of the situation, with the removal of external constraints may lead nonviolent individuals
to engage in violent behavior. Through the violentization process, the perpetrators are
exposed to violence in a progressive desensitization manner to include rewards for
engaging in violent behavior and sanctions for refusing to act violently (Kressel, 2002).
Types of Genocide
Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) define genocide as “a form of one-sided mass killing
in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and
membership in it are defined by the perpetrator” (p. 23). Chalk and Jonassohn described
the four types of genocides as; elimination of a threat, spread of terror, economic gain,
and implementation of ideology. Lemarchand (2004b) classified the Rwandan case as a
threat or retributive genocide.
Although genocides often occur during wars, having a war is not a necessary
condition for genocide to occur. This has been clearly demonstrated by Bartrop (2002)
who identified genocides that occurred without the presence of war. However, war,
revolutions, and ethnic conflict facilitate the violentization process. Harff (2003)
presented a structural model of the antecedents of genocide consisting of genocides and
politicides since 1955. Harff noted that most genocides occurred during times of internal
wars, revolutions, or regime collapses/changes with risk factors including political
upheaval (e.g., violent conflict), prior genocides (habituation to mass killings),
exclusionary ideologies, autocratic rule, ethnic cleavages, and low trade openness.
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Fein (1993) compared two ideological genocides; Indonesia (1965-1966) and
Cambodia (1975-1979). Although different dynamics were present, both countries
experienced multiple crises. Fein demonstrated how the moral exclusion, blaming the
victim, and patrons’ tolerance were used during these genocides. Fein pointed out that
war and genocide are related and that war allows society to release aggression, address
grievances, and hide the genocide through labeling the victim the enemy. Charny (1991)
provided a model that has similarities to Athens’(2003) model and includes factors such
as, dehumanization of a victim group, perception of the victim group as dangerous,
availability of a victim group, and legitimation of the victim group by leaders.
Dutton, Boyanowsky, and Bond (2005) suggested that situational factors, as
opposed to predispositional factors, explain genocide. In other words, genocidal behavior
is situational or context-specific. In discussing the Holocaust, Mann (2000) stated that,
“perpetrators were embedded in institutional sub-cultures already favorable to tough
physical, legal, and biological remedies for social ills years before genocide was
initiated” (p. 351). In their discussion of situation analysis of crime and deviance,
Birkbeck and LaFree (1993) stated that researchers should explore interactions between
perpetrators and situations and opportunities to engage in criminal activity.
The Rwandan Genocide
Before discussing the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, it is necessary to address briefly
the 1972 genocide in Burundi. In 1972, 200,000-300,000 Hutus were killed by the
government-controlled Tutsi after a small Hutu insurgency (Lemarchand, 2004a). The
Tutsi military killed the Hutu men, while the Tutsi civilians killed women and children
with youth militias serving as auxiliary forces and assisting the army with the genocide.
Lemarchand stated that,
because ethnic memories transcend geographical boundaries, it is
impossible to grasp the regional underpinnings of the 1994 Rwanda
genocide unless we appreciate the fact that the horrors of 1972 are
permanently lodged in the collective consciousness of all Hutu, in Rwanda
and in Burundi. (p. 165)
The 1994 genocide in Rwanda, which occurred during a civil war, led to the
deaths of over 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutus by extremist Hutus (Power, 2002). The
goal of each genocide was the extermination of an ethnic group. Thus we have a case of
double or mutual genocide, where the Tutsi committed genocide against the Hutu in
Burundi and, 22 years later, the Hutu committed genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda
(Kressel, 2002). According to Dadrian (2004), “the cyclical character of the atrocities
created the requisite dynamics for this phenomenon of role-reversals and
interchangeability of roles” (p. 510).
After the 1993 assassination of the Hutu president of Burundi, “a more virulent
form of extremism emerged, in the form of Hutu Power” (Lemarchand, 2004b, p. 209).
The Hutus, who opposed Hutu Power, were killed during the genocide (Gourevitch,
1998). The active genocide started with the assassination of the Rwandan president in
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1994. The military and the interahamwe (grass-roots youth wing) carried out most of the
killings (Lemarchand, 2004b).
In order to address how and why genocides occur, several assumptions shaped my
research process. First, I believe that both structural and agency approaches are needed to
understand genocide. Second, I tentatively classify Rwanda as a rigidly enmeshed society
during the genocide, based on previous research on the characteristics of 13 genocides
that included Rwanda (Winton, 2005). Assessment of this classification is further
addressed in the current study. Third, I believe that there are sufficient secondary sources
to determine whether the circumplex and violentization models help to explain the
Rwandan genocide.
Methods
I selected published texts that provided quotations and interpretations of
interviews with perpetrators and analysis of variables related to the Rwandan genocide.
These texts contained information about how the perpetrators and other actors construct,
account, describe, interpret, and explain their understanding of their actions (Berg, 2007;
Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Feldman, 1995; Gergen, 1985; Weber, 1985).
Lincoln and Guba (1985) and Shenton (2004) suggested methods to assess
trustworthiness (credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability) of the data.
I addressed issues of credibility by using accepted content analytic strategies, searching
multiple sources of perpetrator reports, analyzing previous research findings, looking for
negative cases, and presenting the research for peer review. I could only find one other
qualitative study in which the researcher linked violentization theory to a genocide
(Rhodes, 2002), one quantitative study that I conducted earlier using the circumplex
model by analyzing 13 genocides (Winton, 2005), and our Bosnian study in which we
used the circumplex model and violentization theory (Winton & Unlu, 2008).
Dependability was addressed through the presentation of the specific data collection
procedures. In regards to confirmability, I was looking for accounts that supported the
violentization and circumplex model. Directed qualitative content analytic procedures
were used to analyze how the collected data fit within the two theoretical models (Hsieh
& Shannon, 2005). Directed qualitative content analysis is a method used in which the
researcher develops a coding scheme prior to analysis. I coded the data by using the
circumplex model and violentization theory variables.
Data Sources
One of the primary resources for this study was French journalist Jean Hatzfeld’s
(2003) analysis of his interviews with 10 men who were convicted and sentenced to jail
for their participation in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. This source was selected as it is
one of the few accounts of interviews with Rwandan perpetrators. Few studies have been
published that help us understand how the perpetrators made sense of their participation
in the genocide. With the cooperation of the Rwandan government, Hatzfeld conducted
his interviews inside the prison on an individual basis using a translator when needed. He
promised the prisoners that he would not publish any of their accounts of the genocide
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until their legal issues had been resolved and their cases closed. The prisoners did receive
rewards for their participation (e.g., supplies and news from their families).
In reviewing this book, Dudai (2006) stated, “what transpires is a phenomenology
of genocide from the perspective of its immediate perpetrators, painfully unmediated” (p.
700). These 10 men ranged in age from 22 to 62. Some were married and had children.
Their occupations were those of farmers, soccer player, mason, and teacher. Some were
involved with Hutu politics. These men were quite candid in their recollections of the
genocide and explanations of how and why it happened.
In addition, I analyzed convicted Rwandan perpetrator interviews conducted by
Straus (2006). Straus interviewed over 200 prisoners in 15 prisons, asking them questions
about their belief systems, how they became participants in the genocide, and why and
how they engaged in violent behavior during the genocide.
Since research in these areas is usually found in different journals and texts,
multiple databases and texts were consulted. The databases reviewed for this study
included: Criminal Justice Abstracts, Academic Search Premier (EBSCO HOST),
Dissertation Abstracts, Historical Abstracts, JSTOR, Political Science Abstracts,
PsychINFO, SAGE Full text-collections, Sociological Abstracts, Anthropology Plus,
Human Rights Watch reports and African Rights reports. Keywords used were
Circumplex, Violentization, and Rwanda and Genocide.
Through the use of the multiple data bases, additional sources were included to
augment the multiple dimensions of the Rwandan genocide. These sources included
political speech reports (Verwimp, 2000), radio broadcast reports (Fujii, 2004; Kellow &
Steeves, 1998; Li, 2004), reports from interviews with perpetrators (Hinton, 1998;
Mironko, 2004; Straus, 2006), victim reports (Des Forges, 1999; Gourevitch, 1998;
Jones, 2002), and court transcripts. Additionally, comparative studies of genocide
(Dutton, et al., 2005; Fein, 1993; Kressel, 2002; Power, 2002) and book reviews were
reviewed.
I did not find any articles in which the researcher specifically focused on the
Rwandan genocide and the circumplex model or violentization theory. I did find one
author who addressed violentization theory and the Holocaust (Rhodes, 2002), and I used
my article on genocides and the circumplex model published in conference proceedings
(Winton, 2005). The case study method provided by Rhodes’ application of
violentization theory was used as one model for this analysis. According to Rhodes,
“violent-socialization model supplies an evidence-based instrument through which to
view the Third Reich, and specifically the Einsatzgruppen, that may help to illuminate
their history and thus the history of the Holocaust” (p. 27). This allowed Rhodes to trace
how these police battalions became violentized units of killers.
Data Analysis
Hsieh and Shannon (2005) define qualitative content analysis as, “a research
method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic
classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (p. 1278). My goal
was to determine whether I could explain the genocide by using the theoretical
approaches. I used a directed content analysis approach, in which the initial coding
scheme is determined before analysis based on previous research and theory. I used the
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theoretical variables from the circumplex and violentization theories, and coded the text
as I read it; the definitions and examples of each of these variables are discussed below.
Through careful readings of the text, I looked for indicators of the circumplex model and
violentization variables by examining the narratives contained in the data sources. First,
each text was read to determine whether information regarding perpetrator actions were
present. Second, sections of the texts were highlighted and coded using the circumplex
and violentization theory categories (Carpenter, 2002; Feldman, 1995; Ryan & Bernard,
2003; Weber, 1985).
After reading and coding the texts related to violentization theory and the
circumplex model, I constructed a matrix to organize the themes. For example,
circumplex and violentization themes were coded from each chapter in Hatzfeld’s (2003)
text by perpetrator. Using this method, I was able to compare and contrast the perpetrator
statements concerning how the genocide was organized, the experience of the first kill,
reactions to the ongoing killings, punishment, and consequences of the genocide.
Negative exemplars were also collected and noted. For example, there was conflicting
information in Hatzfeld’s study on whether or not the perpetrators would face negative
consequences for refusing to participate in the genocide.
Indicators of enmeshed cohesion include excessive emotional closeness, such as
feeling like family with strangers, being highly dependent on the perpetrator group, being
punished for dissenting thoughts or behaviors, adhering to a strict decision-making
process, and pledging loyalty to the perpetrator group. Statements such as “we were like a
family” were coded as enmeshed cohesion, and group loyalty was demonstrated in the
enmeshed pattern by requiring strong connections and identification between the
perpetrators.
In the enmeshed cohesion group pattern, deviations from the expected behaviors
were punished. For example, perpetrators reporting that they would be killed if they did
not follow the orders to kill were coded as being in an enmeshed pattern. This pattern
also is characterized by a great deal of perpetrator dependency on each other, a pattern
also found in my study of 13 20th century genocides (Winton, 2005).
Disengaged cohesion consisted of a pattern of perpetrator emotional distance. In
this pattern, perpetrators showed high levels of independence and failed to demonstrate
group loyalty. Statements such as “we stayed away from each other” would be coded as
disengaged cohesion. In the disengaged cohesion pattern, failure to follow the perpetrator
group had minimal negative consequences. For example, the perpetrator group may tell
others that they may make a choice to participate or not participate in the killing.
Indicators of rigidity include authoritarian leadership style from the perpetrator
leaders, following a strict code of conduct without room for deviations, having strict and
rigid roles to carry out, and following a set of strict rules and regulations. For example,
statements such as “one must do whatever our leader says without question” would be
coded as rigid flexibility. Rules were strictly enforced and rigid thinking patterns were
encouraged with high levels of social control of others. Another indicator of a rigid
group/organization was the inability to change when confronting a crisis with perpetrator
roles remaining constant.
Chaotic flexibility was present when perpetrator leaders had minimal control over
others. Leadership and leadership styles would change rapidly. Statements such as
“nobody listens to these so called leaders” would be coded as chaotic flexibility. In these
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cases, patterns of social control were low and rules were not enforced, thought patterns
diverse and disorganized. Too much change in response to a stressor or crisis led to a
variety of problems.
Patterns of communication that encourage genocidal behavior were also
described. These included radio, television, newspapers, and community leaders.
Statements from radio broadcasts such as “we must kill all of the Tutsi” would be coded
as genocidal communication patterns.
For violentization theory, the four stages of the violentization process (Athens,
2003) were coded as follows. Indicators of brutalization included perpetrators reporting
that they witnessed violence, that they were shown how to use violence, and that they
were instructed that they had a personal responsibility to use violence. Indicators of
defiance included statements indicating that violence is appropriate in specific situations.
Indicators of violent dominant engagements included putting violent acts to the test.
Indicators of virulency included perpetrators defining themselves as dangerous killers and
receiving group or community support for their violent actions.
One of the primary limitations of directed content analysis is approaching the data
with biases (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). I had already developed the codes and
expectations of what I might find in the data. This led to a risk of finding “supportive”
data as well as finding new and emerging patterns. I addressed this bias by presenting any
contradictions or inconsistencies in the data and providing details about the data sources
that would allow others to cross check or reanalyze the data. Multiple sources were used
in order to cross-validate and reduce the risk of bias from relying on one major source. In
addition, two colleagues reviewed the original manuscript and offered comments and
feedback regarding how well the theories and data fit.
In summary, I followed the steps for directed qualitative content analysis as
outlined by Hsieh and Shannon (2005) to determine whether the two theories were
supported by the data. First, I defined the codes using the circumplex model and
violentization theory categories. Second, I carefully reviewed the data. Third, I analyzed
the texts and noted statements and descriptions that supported the theories. Fourth, I
looked for data that did not support the theories. Fifth, I compared the data to the theories
to determine whether there was support for the theories.
Results
Brutalization- Witnessing, Learning, and Experiencing Violence
The brutalization stage focuses on the teaching and demonstration of violent
behavior, which includes threatening, observing, and learning how to use physical force.
The perpetrators construct a genocidal script that is ready to put into practice.
The Rwandan genocide was planned for several years. Anti-Tutsi propaganda
could be found in the Hutu military newspapers and presented on the radio, and lists of
those who were to be killed were also constructed. The perpetrators had practised killing
prior to the 1994 genocide; during the earlier civil wars, “various genocidal ‘tests’ were
run to check the reaction of the local population, the local officials, the army, and
especially the international community” (Verwimp, 2000, p. 356). The Tutsi were blamed
for Hutu problems and hatred was taught through imitation and societal information.
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Hutu lack of land led to conflict and the Hutu tended to be suspicious of Tutsi.
Prisoner Adalbert reported that the genocide had been discussed since 1959 (Hatzfeld,
2003). Clearly, the Hutus learned to hate and fear the Tutsi, and that there were no
negative consequences for killing Tutsi during these small-scale massacres. The Hutu
were taught that they must use violence toward the Tutsi to avoid becoming victims of
the Tutsi. Straus (2006) quotes from one of his perpetrator interviews.
I told you it was anger. When one is angry, one does not think. . .We
believed that the Tutsi would come to kill us so we had to kill them first
instead of waiting for them to kill us. Me, I saw on television how they kill
and I saw it was extreme meanness. (p. 165)
Witness testimony indicated that the genocide was planned over several years by
members of the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND)
political party. For example,
In 1991, the MRND created its own youth wing. The members of the
MRND’s youth wing were known as the “Interahamwe”. The youth wing
was formed in response to two requirements within the MRND: (a)
Sensitizing the youth to politics and (b) Mobilizing the youths. (Prosecutor
v. Juvenal Kajelijeli, 2003, paragraph 326)
The Interahamwe in the Mukingo commune under the leadership of the
accused from 1991 to July 1994 were: (a) given military training
organized by the Accused; (b) distributed weapons and uniforms by the
accused which were provided by Joseph Nzirorera; and (c) distributed lists
of Tutsis to be eliminated. (Prosecutor v. Juvenal Kajelijeli, 2003,
paragraph 330)
To prepare for the genocide,
Politicians solicited Augustin Habiyambere to train young Interahamwe
recruits of Hutu ethnic origin for “preparation of the offences.” Augustin
Habiyambere was directed by them “to carry out an attack on the enemy”
because Rwanda was being attacked by the RPF since 1990 and “[they]
should be ready because some day [they] would be attacked.” The
Accused and Sendugu Shadrack supervised the training of the
Interahamwe youth in the use of weapons, including Kalashnikovs and
ML4 rifles. The Witness affirmed that “two military instructors, one from
the Mukamira Camp and another former FAR” were present at each
training session. A sensitisation meeting was held after each military
session to prepare the young militants for combat. (Prosecutor v. Juvenal
Kajelijeli, 2003, paragraph 362)
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Defiance--Using Violence to Stop Violence
In the defiance stage, the perpetrator group develops a belief system that supports
the use of violence to perceived threats. The leaders encourage and reinforce the belief
system to justify the use of violence.
According to Fujii (2004), “genocidal leaders had to transform the normative
environment such that actions that were once considered verboten (such as killing thy
neighbor) could be viewed as not only legitimate but imperative” (pp. 99-100). Fujii
described the process of creating a genocidal norm in Rwanda as spreading the genocidal
message, preventing contradictory messages, creating events (false threats from Tutsi),
and rehearsing (small scale massacres). The leaders had successfully constructed the
genocidal message and many Rwandan citizens had internalized the genocidal script that
the Tutsi were a threat that had to be eradicated through the only available option;
genocide.
Straus (2006) pointed out that, “once a point was reached when those promoting
violence consolidated control and once men started killing, they themselves became
increasingly violent and demanded conformity from their peers” (p. 89). Consistent with
violentization theory, Straus found that perpetrators engaged in violent behavior to
protect and defend themselves from the rebels and to avoid punishments for avoiding
participation. Whether accurate or not, the Hutu perpetrators were led to believe that they
had a choice; to kill or be killed (Straus).
According to prisoner Elie, “on April 10 the burgomaster in a pressed suit and all
the authorities gathered us together. They lectured us, they threatened in advance anyone
who bungled the job, and the killings began without much planning” (Hatzfeld, 2003, p.
15). Straus (2006) reported that one of his respondents explained defiance.
We were told that the plane carrying Habyarimana and Burundi’s
president had been shot down. That is when the killings began. People
understood that if the head of state is killed first, then the peasants would
be next; in other words, that the Tutsi regime was coming back. (p. 155)
In one case, a clergyman refused to assist the Tutsi and encouraged the
perpetrators to kill the Tutsi. The clergyman’s actions indicated that he held a belief
system that it was permissible and desirable to have Hutu kill Tutsi. I found the following
witness testimony in the court transcripts.
From about 12 April 1994, refugees were confined by the gendarmes and
surrounded by the militiamen and Interahamwe armed with traditional and
conventional weapons. Father Athanase SEROMBA did prevent the
refugees from taking food and instructed the gendarmes to shoot any
“Inyenzi” (reference to Tutsi) who tried to take some food from the
Presbytere or the parish banana groves. He refused to celebrate mass for
them and stressed that he didn’t want to do that for the Inyenzi.
(Prosecutor v. Athanase Seromba, 2001, paragraph 12)
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Violent Dominant Engagements- Carrying Out Violent Acts
In the violent dominant engagements stage the perpetrators use violent behavior.
Once brutalization and defiance have been internalized by the perpetrators the leaders
instruct the perpetrators to begin the killings.
Hatzfeld (2003) was able to obtain descriptions of how the perpetrators helped
others to learn to kill. The perpetrators reported that using a machete to kill was easy
since they often used the machete in their fields. Prisoner Leopord stated, “At the time of
those murders I didn’t even notice the tiny thing that would change me into a killer”
(Hatzfeld, p. 27). The perpetrators used imitation and repetition to teach their colleagues
how to kill. According to prisoner Adalbert, “doing it over and over: repetition smoothed
out clumsiness. That is true, I believe, for any kind of handiwork” (Hatzfeld, p. 36).
The perpetrators described their first kill with indifference and that killing became
easier with time. According to Li (2004), the radio broadcasts,
helped Rwandans make sense of their active participation in the genocide
in terms that were broader than simple hatred or fear of the Tutsi by
creating a context in which euphemisms such as “work” and
“cockroaches” could be easily understood through an indirectness that left
nothing unsaid. (p. 13)
Prisoner Jean-Baptiste described his first kill.
The crowd had grown. I seized the machete, I struck a first blow. When I
saw the blood bubble up, I jumped back a step. Someone blocked me from
behind and shoved me forward by both elbows. I closed my eyes in the
brouhaha and I delivered a second blow like the first. It was done, people
approved, they were satisfied and moved away. I drew back…Later on we
got used to killing without so much dodging around. (Hatzfeld, 2003, p.
23)
Children and adults, males and females, were shown how to kill by the soldiers
(Jones, 2002). They were given permission and encouragement to engage in violence. In
some cases, they were threatened if they did not take part in the killings.
The killers described becoming crueler with time. They also described that there
were no negative consequences for killing and that there might be negative consequences
for failing to kill. The killers engaged in sexual violence (e.g., rapes were followed by
murder). Adults, infants, and children were killed. Children were also forced to kill others
(Hatzfeld, 2003).
According to Kellow and Steeves (1998), Rwandan radio incited much of the
genocidal behavior through a kill-or-be-killed framework reporting that “by 1993,
political dichotomization was extreme” (p. 115). Kellow and Steeves found that the
media was used to encourage racial hatred several years before the genocide occurred.
The radio presented false reports of Tutsi attacking, torturing, and killing Hutu. In
reference to a popular radio station, Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM),
Kellow and Steeves stated that,
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during the genocide broadcasts, RTLM used several narrative techniques
to incite killings. A relentless, “risk and danger,” “kill or be killed” frame,
and related “violence” and “victims” frames, emphasizing gruesome
consequences of violence for victims, were the most blatant. (p. 124)
Articles and pictures in the leading Kanguru newspaper also contained warnings
and statements written to encourage and provide permission to attack the Tutsi. For
example,
These writings portrayed the Tutsi as inherently wicked and ambitious in
language clearly intended to fan the flames of resentment and anger,
directed against the Tutsi population. The cover of Kangura No. 26
answered the question “What weapons shall we use to conquer the Inyenzi
once and for all?” with the depiction of a machete. The message conveyed
by this cover was a message of violence, that the machete should be used
to conquer the Inyenzi once and for all. By Inyenzi, Kangura meant, and
was understood to mean, all Rwandans of Tutsi ethnicity, who in this issue
of Kangura were stereotyped as having the inherent characteristics of liars,
thieves and killers. (Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco
Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze, 2003, paragraph 17)
Virulency- Violent and Dangerous Selves
In the virulency stage, the group has defined itself as violent and dangerous. I did
find that some of the prisoners disagreed with other prisoners regarding the negative
consequences of failing to participate in the genocide. The perpetrators reported that
when they became successful killers the encouragement to kill or negative sanctions for
avoiding killing were no longer needed. According to prisoner Jean-Baptiste, “We
became naturally cruel. We no longer needed encouragement or fines to kill, or even
orders or advice. Discipline was relaxed because it wasn’t necessary anymore” (Hatzfeld,
2003, p. 74). According to prisoner Pio,
we no longer saw a human being when we turned up a Tutsi in the
swamps…this killer was indeed me, as to the offense he committed and
the blood he shed, but he is a stranger to me in his ferocity. (pp. 47-48)
The killers, along with their spouses, participated in looting, and had support from
neighbors (e.g., food and alcohol). When the killers returned home from a day of killing,
they had celebrations that resulted in greater cohesion and positive reinforcement for
killing. Additionally, there were killing shows or jamborees in which community
members would cheer and shout as they watched the perpetrators slowly kill their
victims.
In the clergyman case cited previously, the clergyman congratulated the
perpetrators for their violent behavior. This type of behavior could encourage the
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perpetrators to define themselves as violent and dangerous and would also help to
increase group cohesion and the dehumanization of the victims. The witness explained,
that following the 15 April 1994 attacks, Athanase Seromba congratulated
some of the assailants by throwing down bottles of beer to them from the
“second floor” of the presbytery. The witness testified that he saw
Seromba later in the evening at the secretariat, holding a discussion with
the Interahamwe and the gendarmes. Seromba allegedly asked them to
bring a mechanical digger to remove the bodies strewn on the ground in
front of the church. (Prosecutor v. Athanase Seromba, 2006, paragraph
166)
After the destruction of the church,
the authorities held a meeting in the Parish. Soon after, Father SEROMBA
ordered the Interahamwe to clean the “rubbish.” The bodies of victims
were placed into common graves. (Prosecutor v. Athanase Seromba, 2001,
paragraph 29)
Mironko (2004) described the killers as hunters who dehumanized the Tutsi to
encourage the killings. The Hutu killers were taught by the government that they had a
duty to kill Tutsi, as they had killed their families in a previous genocide, and that they
would be killed by the Tutsi if they did not kill them first.
Jones (2002) provided an example of Hutu perpetrator virulency stating,
their preening swagger rapidly came to terrify even the Hutu general
population and the extremist leadership. It typified the pathological
machismo that is usually central to the perpetration of genocide, and that
the authorities, well aware of its murderous potential, had hoped to
channel and control. (p. 76)
Extreme Virulency- Torture, Rape, and Mass Murder
This stage has been added to the violentization model to address behavior that
went beyond killing the victims and resulted in torture and mutilation. Some of these
descriptions share similarities with serial killer profiles. Extreme virulency goes beyond
virulency in intensity, severity, and scope of the violent behavior.
Mironko (2004) described a case in which a child observed her father having his
head cut open, his nose cut off, his penis cut off, and stuffed in his mouth. Clearly, this is
a case of extreme virulency. Some of the perpetrators raped women and girls, forced
them into sexual slavery, and then killed them (Des Forges, 1999). Des Forges also
reported women being mutilated.
Victim testimony provides more information about the violentization process. In
the following case, extreme violence is carried out by several perpetrators belonging to
the Interahamwe militia group.
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Allegations of sexual violence first came to the attention of the Chamber
through the testimony of Witness J, a Tutsi woman, who stated that her six
year-old daughter had been raped by three Interahamwe when they came
to kill her father. On examination by the Chamber, Witness J also testified
that she had heard that young girls were raped at the bureau communal.
Subsequently, Witness H, a Tutsi woman, testified that she herself was
raped in a sorghum field and that, just outside the compound of the bureau
communal, she personally saw other Tutsi women being raped and knew
of at least three such cases of rape by Interahamwe. Witness H testified
initially that the Accused, as well as commune police officers, were
present while this was happening and did nothing to prevent the rapes.
(Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, paragraph 416)
Witness JJ testified that the refugees at the bureau communal had been
beaten by the Interahamwe and were lying on the ground when she
arrived. Witness JJ encountered four Interahamwe outside the bureau
communal, armed with knives, clubs, small axes and small hoes. That
afternoon, she said, approximately forty more Interahamwe came and beat
the refugees, including Witness JJ. At this time she said she saw the
Accused, standing in the courtyard of the communal office, with two
communal police officers who were armed with guns, one of whom was
called Mushumba. Witness JJ said she was beaten on the head, the ribs
and the right leg, which left her disabled. That evening, she said, the
Accused came with a policeman to look for refugees and ordered the
Interahamwe to beat them up, calling them “wicked, wicked people” and
saying they “no longer had a right to shelter.” The refugees were then
beaten and chased away. Witness JJ said she was beaten by the policeman
Mushumna, who hit her with the butt of his gun just behind her ear.
(Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, paragraph 419)
Witness JJ testified that often the Interahamwe came to beat the refugees
during the day, and that the policemen came to beat them at night. She
also testified that the Interahamwe took young girls and women from their
site of refuge near the bureau communal into a forest in the area and raped
them. Witness JJ testified that this happened to her - that she was stripped
of her clothing and raped in front of other people. At the request of the
Prosecutor and with great embarrassment, she explicitly specified that the
rapist, a young man armed with an axe and a long knife, penetrated her
vagina with his penis. She stated that on this occasion she was raped
twice. Subsequently, she told the Chamber, on a day when it was raining,
she was taken by force from near the bureau communal into the cultural
center within the compound of the bureau communal, in a group of
approximately fifteen girls and women. In the cultural center, according to
Witness JJ, they were raped. She was raped twice by one man. Then
another man came to where she was lying and he also raped her. A third
man then raped her, she said, at which point she described herself as
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feeling near dead. Witness JJ testified that she was at a later time dragged
back to the cultural center in a group of approximately ten girls and
women and they were raped. She was raped again, two times. Witness JJ
testified that she could not count the total number of times she was raped.
She said, “each time you encountered attackers they would rape you”- in
the forest, in the sorghum fields. Witness JJ related to the Chamber the
experience of finding her sister before she died, having been raped and cut
with a machete. (Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, paragraph 421)
The Circumplex Model
Rwandan society had unbalanced levels of cohesion and flexibility falling into the
rigid and enmeshed patterns (Winton, 2005). The Rwandan hardliners brought together
Hutu in order to kill Tutsi (Straus, 2006). The perpetrator group formed highly cohesive
interactions with each other and their societal institutions, and presented a rigid
leadership pattern. Communication patterns from government officials, community
leaders, and radio announcements justified the killings, removed negative sanctions, and
defined the victims as dangerous. According to Straus these were ordinary Rwandans
who participated in the genocide “because other men encouraged, intimidated, and
coerced them to do so in the name of authority and ‘the law’” (p. 122) and because they
were fearful of and angry at the Tutsi. This is also consistent with the obedience research
of Milgram (1974) and Zimbardo (2007).
The genocide was organized around a rigid schedule of wake up, eat, meet, and
kill. Rigid leadership roles also emerged during the organization of the genocide, as
prisoner Ignace stated, “suddenly Hutus of every kind were patriotic brothers without
partisan discord” (Hatzfeld, 2003, p. 16). Hatzfeld also pointed out that the groups of
killers met on the soccer field and formed into teams. Many of the perpetrators knew each
other and their victims from their community interactions. The threat-based genocidal
script was clearly constructed by Hutu leaders. In his analysis of the genocide,
Gourevitch (1998) stated,
genocide, after all, is an exercise in community building. . . In 1994,
Rwanda was regarded in much of the rest of the world as the exemplary
instance of the chaos and anarchy associated with collapsed states. In fact,
the genocide was the product of order, authoritarianism, decades of
modern political theorizing and indoctrination, and one of the most
meticulously administered states in history. (p. 95)
The Hutu Ten Commandments were published in the popular Kangura
newspaper, and the author of these commandments provided encouragement and
permission to kill Tutsi. The author encouraged the Hutu to become a cohesive group
while delineating definitions of the enemy. The following information regarding the Hutu
Ten Commandments was obtained from the court transcripts.
The Ten Commandments were published in Kangura No. 6, in December
1990, within an article entitled Appeal to the Conscience of the Hutu. The
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introduction of this article warned readers: The enemy is still there, among
us, and is biding his time to try again, at a more propitious moment, to
decimate us. Therefore, Hutu, wherever you may be, wake up! Be firm
and vigilant. Take all necessary measures to deter the enemy from
launching a fresh attack. (Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco
Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze, 2003, paragraph 12)
The second part of the article entitled, The Tutsi Ambition described the
Tutsi as “bloodthirsty,” and referred to their continuing ideology of Tutsi
domination over the Hutu, and to the “permanent dream of the Tutsi” to
restore Tutsi minority rule. The article referred to a plan of 1962, in which
the Tutsi were to resort to two weapons they thought effective against the
Hutu; “money and the Tutsi woman.” One part of the article entitled, The
Tutsi Woman stated that Tutsi women were sold or married to Hutu
intellectuals or highly placed Hutu officials, where they could serve as
spies in influential Hutu circles and arrange government appointments,
issue special import licenses, and pass secrets to the enemy. Another part,
which included the The Ten Commandments, exhorted the Hutu to wake
up “now or never” and become aware of a new Hutu ideology, with roots
in and in defence of the 1959 revolution. Reference was made to the
historical servitude of the Hutu, and readers were urged to “be prepared to
defend themselves against this scourge.” The Hutu were urged to “cease
feeling pity for the Tutsi!” The article then set forth The Ten
Commandments (Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco
Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze, 2003, paragraph 13).
The first commandment warns Hutu men of the dangers of Tutsi women
and deems a traitor any Hutu man who marries a Tutsi woman, keeps a
Tutsi mistress, or makes a Tutsi woman his secretary or protégée. Another
commandment casts as a traitor any Hutu man who enters into business
with Tutsi partners, invests his or state money in a Tutsi company, or
lends to or borrows from a Tutsi. Other commandments require that
strategic political, economic, and military positions be entrusted to the
Hutu, that students and teachers should be in the majority Hutu, and that
the Hutu be united in solidarity and “seek friends and allies for the Hutu
cause.” The ninth commandment concludes, “The Hutu must be firm and
vigilant towards their common Tutsi enemy” (Prosecutor v. Ferdinand
Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze, 2003, paragraph
14).
The Appeal to the Conscience of the Hutu portrayed the Tutsi as a ruthless
enemy, determined to conquer the Hutu, and called on the Hutu to take all
necessary measures to stop the enemy. Kangura published the 19
Commandments to alert readers to the evil nature of the Tutsi and their
intention to take power and subjugate the Hutu. The Ten Commandments
of the Hutu and the 19 Commandments of the Tutsi were complementary
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efforts to the same end: the promotion of fear and hatred among the Hutu
population of the Tutsi minority and the mobilization of the Hutu
population against them. This appeal to the Hutu was visibly sustained in
every issue of Kangura from February 1991 to March 1994 by the title
“The Voice that Awakens and Defends the Majority People.” (Prosecutor
v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze,
2003, paragraph 16)
Mironko (2004) found from perpetrator interviews that igitero, or group attack,
was used as an explanation for genocidal behavior. Mironko also pointed out that group
attacks had occurred since 1959, and were based on existing cohesion and a rigid
atmosphere that became more intense as the perpetrators became more virulent killers.
The perpetrators were encouraged to develop into a more cohesive and rigid
groups through several strategies. For example,
prosecution Witness GDQ testified that on 8 April 1994, the Interahamwe
organized a feast at a bar owned by the Accused to congratulate
themselves on their victory the day before. The Witness stated that, in the
presence of the Accused, they sang a song with the words “Tuzu, tsemba
tsembe,” which means to exterminate something you hope to have
disappear completely. According to the Witness, when the Interahamwe
sang the song they meant persons who were considered the enemies of the
country, in other words, the Tutsi-Bigogwe. (Prosecutor v. Juvenal
Kajelijeli, 2003, paragraph 707)
Discussion
The aim of this study was to determine whether the circumplex model and
violentization theory apply to the 1994 Rwandan genocide. I found that using the
circumplex model and violentization theory allowed me to show how the perpetrators
moved through the violentization process, as their society moved toward a rigid and
enmeshed state. I showed that the circumplex model and violentization theory may be
used by researchers as a working model, although additional research needs to be
conducted.
As Hutu became more fearful of a civil war occurring, some Hutu leaders began
to move other Hutu to a rigid and enmeshed group structure. The perpetrator groups
became closer and tightly organized, and group loyalty and obedience were required.
They became more dependent on one another for direction and feedback regarding their
relationships to their Tutsi neighbors. Authoritarian leadership styles became more
pronounced, as radio broadcasts became a major mode of authority for information and
instructions for action.
Many Hutu had already learned to hate and fear the Tutsi. Several small
massacres had taken place without negative consequences for the perpetrators, and the
belief that violence toward Tutsi was justified and necessary became part of a cultural
norm. Communication patterns encouraging Hutu to kill Tutsi emerged. The perpetrators
were shown how to kill and given opportunities to loot. Peer pressure added another
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motivating factor to engage in violence. Although there were inconsistencies in this
study, some perpetrators reported that they killed to avoid being killed, and this was also
reinforced through radio broadcasts. This situation provided two sources of threat to
include being killed by Tutsi or killed by Hutu for failing to participate. As the genocide
progressed, the perpetrators reported becoming crueler; some perpetrators became
extremely violent and tortured and mutilated the victims.
There are several limitations to this study. The application of this model to a
single genocide may not generalize to other genocides, and further research would need
to be conducted on several additional genocides. The use of secondary sources did not
allow me to ask direct questions that might better address the theories. I did not address
the process that occurred that led Hutu to avoid killing others and in some cases, helping
Tutsi escape the slaughter. I also did not address how a non-violent person moves rapidly
to a genocidal person and then back to a non-violent person. Finally, one assumption of
the model is that social change is a precursor to genocide. In contrast, Kissi (2004) points
out that “genocide and politicide do not necessarily occur in the context of change. They
can be products of resistance to change” (p. 130).
The results of this study are congruent with the findings of another study on the
Bosnian genocide (Winton & Unlu, 2008). Using the same methods used in this study,
we found that we were able to apply the circumplex model and violentization theory to
the development and enactment of the Bosnian genocide. There are several similarities
between these two genocides. There were previous genocides that had occurred in both
countries and were presented by the current genocidal leaders as reasons to fear, hate, and
attack the victims. The violentization process had already been put into place by military
groups and some of the public as both genocides occurred during civil wars. The media
was used in Rwanda and Bosnia to communicate hatred and fear of the victims and to
dehumanize them. Finally, both of these cases were coded as rigidly enmeshed during the
genocide (Winton & Unlu).
There also are differences between the two genocides. Concentration camps were
set up in the Bosnian genocide, but not in the Rwandan case. The Bosnian genocide
involved conflict between several religious groups. The Rwandan genocide took place
over a period of months, while the Bosnian genocide lasted years (1992-1998).
One reviewer brought to my attention the question of whether or not I needed to
use the two theories rather than only one of the theories. This is a very important
question. Based on my previous study (Winton, 2005), I found that the circumplex model
did not allow me to answer some of my research questions regarding social interaction. In
contrast, Rhodes (2002) successfully applied violentization theory to a case study of
genocide. Researchers may prefer using violentization theory to explain individual or
small group violent behavior during the genocide, while the circumplex model may be
more appropriate to be used by researchers to explain the societal dynamics related to the
genocide. Additional research is needed to provide a sufficient answer to this question.
Further researchers might use Turner’s (2005) suggestion to take a top down
approach and focus more on how the macro factors influence the micro factors. Studying
both the ideology and the bureaucracy can lead to a more integrated approach (Porter,
2006). The development of a circumplex society map that follows the patterns developed
by Olson (2000) might be helpful in applying the concepts to macro level variables such
as the economic, military, and political systems. This would involve developing a new
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conceptual procedure for measuring the circumplex model dimensions at the macro level,
which might involve qualitative content analysis of text, radio and television broadcasts,
and other relevant cultural artifacts.
Ulmer (2003) recommended that further violentization researchers focus on
additional testing of the model using a variety of methods, applying the theory to culture
and media and violence, and studying the deviolentization process. In addition, Ulmer
recommended examining the violentization process in the Rwandan and Yugoslavian
genocides.
O’Donnell (2003) provided a critique of Athens’ work and pointed out that there
are cases that do not fit the violentization model. For example, military personnel may go
through the violentization process but are rarely violent in their civilian lives. In addition,
others who do not go through the violentization process may encourage extreme violence
(e.g., genocidal bureaucrats). This might lead to further research on different types of
violentization. While Athens’ violentization model fits with his sample of violent
prisoners, further work needs to be completed on the applications of his theory to larger
scale violence (Sanborn, 2003).
I suggest that future researchers use historical-comparative methods focusing on
the preconditions, genocide event, and post-genocide event by analyzing common and
different aspects of the genocides (Huttenbach, 2004) using the circumplex model and
violentization theory. This type of research may encourage other criminal justice
professionals to publish research, present at conferences, and teach courses with a focus
on genocide.
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